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Abstract: Severe financial consequences of data breaches enforce organizations to reconsider their
cybersecurity investment. Although attack frequency and trends seem similar per industry, the impact of a
data breach may exponentially increase depending on the type of information and the amount of the stolen
data. Also, governments develop and improve laws and regulations to protect the privacy of individuals.
Therefore, a failure of data security may yield severe penalties and class-action lawsuits, which can
significantly increase the expenses than before. The monetary impact of a data breach is a new field of study
that requires more sophisticated research and analysis. There are very few studies that quantify the monetary
value of data breaches, which are based on the number of affected people or the number of stolen records.
This study proposes a new methodology to quantify the monetary value of the data breaches by categorizing
information as personally identifiable information (PII) and sensitive personally identifiable information (SPII).
Our findings indicate that the categorization of the stolen information has more relation than solely the
number of affected people or the number of stolen records. Also, SPII data breaches have more class-action
lawsuits, which yield higher costs than PII data breaches.
Keywords: data breach, cyber risk, the economics of cybersecurity, cyber insurance

1. Introduction
Data breach incidents have been fast becoming a vital instrument in cybersecurity risk assessment. Security of
the data plays an essential role in keeping the reputation of the company as well as avoiding financial fees or
litigations. A primary concern of data breach is severe financial consequences.
Quantifying the data breach risk into a financial value is a phenomenon that insurers or risk managers still try
to solve due to the unavailability of the data and latent costs. Data breach costs may exceed hundreds of
million dollars, which can severely jeopardize an organization’s financial health. Therefore, understanding the
data breach and its impact on business will guide the decision-makers to invest smarter in cybersecurity as
well as considering non-technical options such as cyber-insurance. Also, the insurance industry needs to
understand the likelihood and impact of a data breach to underwrite and sell cyber-insurance. This study will
bring a new methodology for data breach impact assessment by categorizing the information as sensitive and
not-sensitive for decision-makers and insurers.

2. Literature Review
Cyber-crime is not new. The first cyber-crime occurred in 1973 in a New York Bank that a teller embezzled $2
million by using a computer (Wavefront, n.d.). Recent developments in cyber technologies have led to
upgrading the cyberattack techniques and methods in cyber-crime. However, the study of a data breach is a
new field of cyber-crime that has an increasing monetary impact.
There are plenty of studies to determine the optimal amount of cybersecurity investment, cyber-risk score, or
monetary impact of availability compromise (Arora et al., 2004; Bahşi et al., 2018; Cavusoglu et al., 2008;
Fielder et al., 2016; Garvey et al., 2013; Gordon and Loeb, 2002; Karabacak and Sogukpinar, 2005; Keskin et al.,
2018; Lam, 2015; Shetty et al., 2018; Tatar et al., 2016). Also, there are few studies to understand the trends,
frequency, and distribution of the data breach incidents (Edwards et al., 2016; Eling and Loperfido, 2017;
Wheatley et al., 2019).
However, there are very few studies to understand the monetary impact of data breaches (Jacobs, 2014;
Layton and Watters, 2014; Romanosky, 2016; Tatar, 2019). The relevant studies are summarized below.

Romanosky (2016) used the Advisen dataset to develop a regression model to calculate the monetary impact
of a security breach. The proposed model finds revenue, and the number of records has a correlation with the
cost. He says that a 10% increase in revenue would raise the impact of 1.3%. Also, according to his model, a
10% increase in the number of records compromised would escalate the cost of 2.9%.
Another regression model is proposed by employing the Cost of Data Breach dataset (Jacobs, 2014). The
author claims that a 10% increase in the lost number of records begets a 7.6% increase in the cost of the data
breach. Layton and Watters (2014) estimated the tangible costs of data breaches using two case studies, based
on a salary guide and rough estimation of the work hours of the people who were dealing with the data
breach. Whereas only tangible cost is labor cost, loss of reputation is regarded as an only intangible cost. Tatar
(2019) developed a mathematical model regarding dependency and inter-dependency, and confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of the assets.

3. Personally Identifiable Information (PII)
This study will focus on personally identifiable information (PII) data breaches. The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) defines the PII as (DHS, 2017): “any information that permits the identity of an individual to be
directly or indirectly inferred, including any other information that is linked or linkable to that individual,
regardless of whether the individual is a U.S. citizen, legal permanent resident, visitor to the U.S., or employee
or contractor to the Department."
Sensitive PII (SPII) is defined as “personally identifiable information which, if lost, compromised or disclosed
without authorization, could result in substantial harm, embarrassment, inconvenience or unfairness to an
individual.”(DHS, 2017).
Tables 1 and 2 is provided to elaborate PII and SPII (DHS, 2017; STIP, 2018; WDPI, n.d.):
Table 1: Examples of PII
PII
Name
Account name/ user ID
Password
Email
Address
Telephone number
Education credentials/certificates
Date/place of birth
Vehicle title number
Table 2. Examples of SPII
SPII
Social security numbers
Medical history
Credit/ debit card numbers
Driver’s license numbers
Bank account numbers
Passport numbers
Alien registration numbers
Biometric identifiers
Taxpayer identification number

4. Why is the information stolen?
A PII data breach may be a result of intentional or unintentional disclosure of data. Finance and healthcare
industries are the primary targets of malicious actors. Credit cards and medical information are the most
stolen data from organizations (Romanosky, 2016). Massive data breaches in recent years attracted
government and media attention to those events such as Home Depot, Target, Anthem, Equifax, Capital One
cases. Table 3 shows the five most notorious mega data breaches and their cost to the victim companies.
Table 3: Mega Data Breaches
Company
Number of affected people Cost of Data Breach ($ in millions)
Anthem
78 million
406.5
Equifax
147 million
1445
Home Depot
56 million
340
Sony PSN
77 million
193
Yahoo
3 billion
502
Data breach attacks may be carried out by individual hackers, insiders, hacktivists, organized-crime groups, or
states. If they steal an intellectual property product or business secret or a blueprint, it gives a significant
benefit to the attackers. However, what is the benefit of stealing PII?
Hackers hack for money, fun, challenge, and “to do good in the world” (Tatar and Celik, 2015). Malicious actors
search for PII or SPII to make money by duplicating credit cards, printing passports or I.D.s, blackmail,
espionage, or profiling purposes for a foreign government (Tatar et al., 2016) (Fingas, 2017; Verizon, 2019).
The selling price of the information in the dark web varies depending on the sensitivity of the information; for
example, passports or diplomas are more expensive (Stack, 2019). The stolen data may be sold in the dark web
by identity thieves as (Stack, 2019):
• Sell the data as a one-off, such as credit card numbers
• Sell bulk data, similar types of information
• Sell bundled data, different types of information are bundled together

5. Why are data breaches significant for governments?
According to the Department of Defense (DoD), a breach of personal information is defined as “the act of
accessing by or disclosing information to unauthorized individuals or compromising in a way where the subjects
of the information are negatively affected” (DOD Privacy Program, 2014). Information in this context refers to
any personal information that can be used to identify or communicate with the subject matter (Johnson,
2007). With technological advancements, this information is easier to collect (Meingast et al., 2006), and the
potential misuse of individuals' data in deceptive acts raises an array of unique ethical issues and
consequences to both individuals and organizations. Individuals may suffer from embarrassment or blackmail,
while organizations may face a lack of public trust, a decrease in reputation, and legal liabilities.
Implementing laws and regulations governing the protection of PII became a necessity at different levels, the
federal level, the state level, and international level. This is a list of the most important federal laws and
directives related to PII.
• Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)
• The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA)
• Social Security Number Protection Act of 2005
• Identity Theft Prevention Act of 2005
• Privacy Act of 1974
• The E-Government Act of 2002
• The Confidential Information Protection and Statistical Efficiency Act (CIPSEA)
• The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) – relating to PII protections for student
educational records
• The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH)
• The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) – regulating how consumer reporting agencies use credit
information

•

The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) – relating to the privacy of children under 1

At the state level, Security breach laws notification related to PII are adopted by all states defining PII and have
provisions on the entities that must respect it. The notification law complies with federal laws as well as
international laws.
In the next sections, the laws and regulations related to the health and financial sector will be explained. These
laws are applied within strict guidelines with the intent to protect the confidentiality and integrity of
individuals’ information.

6. Healthcare regulations and laws
In the healthcare sector, there are many regulations that address the collection, use, and disclosure of PII. The
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) is the most important one. It was put into effect in
2003 to protect the confidentiality of individuals. This act defines protected health information as any
information that can relate to the health condition and the health care of individuals (Al-Fedaghi, 2008). It
refers to the information that is transmitted or kept by electronic media or any other medium (under
electronic protected health information).
The HIPAA is considered an extension of the privacy act of 1974. The Privacy Act of 1974 protects all
information maintained in any system of records, including the healthcare system. Information refers to “any
information about an individual that is maintained by an agency, including, but not limited to, his education,
financial transactions, medical history, and criminal or employment history and that contains his name, or the
identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual, such as a finger or voice
print or a photograph" (Marine corps division instruction 5211.1, 2012). Furthermore, if the service is related
to the healthcare and the government service as well, it is posted by the E-Government Act also directed OMB
to provide privacy guidance to Federal agencies on many PII related issues such as remote access to PII, and
encryption of PII on mobile devices.
In case this act is not kept, criminal and civil sanctions are available. Tables 4 and 5 summarize both
(Edemekong et al., 2019)
Table 4: Civil Sanctions
Civil
Due to failure to acknowledgment, $100 fine per violation with an annual maximum of
$25,000 for those who repeat violation. There is also $50,000 per violation and an
annual maximum of $1.5 million.
Due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect: There is $1000 charge per
violation, an annual maximum of $100,000 for those who repeatedly violate. There is
also a $50,000 penalty per violation and an annual maximum of $1.5 million.
Due to willful neglect, with violation corrected within the required time. There is a
$10,000 penalty per violation, an annual maximum of $250,000 for repeat violations.
There is a $50,000 penalty per violation with an annual maximum of $1.5 million.
Due to willful neglect and not corrected. There is a penalty of $50,000 per violation, an
annual maximum of $1,000,000, $50,000 per violation, and an annual maximum of $1.5
million.
Table 5. Criminal Sanctions
Criminal
For entities that are covered and specified individuals who obtain or disclose
individually identifiable health information willfully and knowingly: The penalty is up to
$50,000 and imprisonment for up to 1 year.
For offenses committed under pretenses, the penalty is up to $100,000 with
imprisonment for up to 5 years.
For offenses committed with the intent to sell, transfer, or use individually identifiable

health information for commercial advantage, personal gain, or malicious harm, the
penalty is up to $250,000 with imprisonment up to 10 years.

7. Finance regulations and laws
In finance, individual information is governed under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA). The GLBA is
the first federal law adopted, it outlines guidelines to protect consumers' data privacy from financial
institutions and credit card companies, and it clarifies the responsibilities of financial institutes towards the
privacy of their clients' information (Akhigbe & Whyte, 2004). If this act is violated, the company will be fined
$100,000 for each violation and imprisonment for up to five years. The GLBA complies with the consumer
protection act of 1968, specifically the right to safety. Furthermore, the right to financial privacy act is an
essential act of 1978. Under the Financial Privacy Act, government officials can only get financial records to an
individual if they get written consent or obtain a subpoena.

8. International data breach and regulations
At the international level, specifically in Europe, personal data is protected by a data breach regulationGeneral Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). This regulation does not specify the inclusion of PII, but
understandably PII is part of personal data. The main principal covered is that GDPR is data protection
(Goddard, 2017) of E.U. citizens from any organization collecting their data, disregarding the company location
(Tankar,2016).
Failure to comply with this regulation, companies may encounter penalties ranging from “€10 million or 2% of
the company’s global annual turnover of the previous financial year to €20 million or 4% of the company’s
global annual turnover of the previous financial year, whichever is higher” (Tobin et al, 2017).

9. Limitations
Due to the lack of publicly available data, this study has the limitations below:
• The data breaches include cases where the number of affected people is more than one million
• The study only covers organizations for profit
• The sample size is small due to the lack of available information about the data breach incidents

10. Methodology
10.1 Data Collection
The Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (PRC) data breach database is used to determine the mega data breaches as
of November 4, 2018. Only for-profit organizations are considered. As a result, 133 distinct mega data
breaches occurred from 2004 to 2018, with the addition of the AOL 2004 data breach. Next, each case is
searched for the following parameters:
• Cost type and amount of data breach
• Number and type of stolen data:
o Total number of PII
o Total number of SPII
As a result, 31 cases have answers to the parameters above. This dataset mostly focuses on the impact of the
data breach on the U.S. and E.U. citizens due to well-defined laws, regulations, and the existence of agencies
to monitor cyber-crimes.

10.2 Model
Exploratory data analysis is performed to identify the patterns, factors for similarities in mega data breaches.
Next, regression models performed to determine the linear relation of predictors to the response variables.
Simple linear regression is applied to detect the linear relation of the number of people with the cost of the
data breach. The first model includes the intercept and the number of people. The 2nd model includes

intercept, PII, and SPII. Cost is the response variable in both regression models. Both models' intercept is
statistically non-significant; therefore, the models are run without the intercept in both models. Independent
variables are statistically significant in both regression models. The output is illustrated in Table 6.
Table 6: Regression Model Outputs
s
Number of people
PII and SPII

R2
0.367
I 0.75

Adjusted R2
0.347
0.733

1st model regression equation:
Cost = 1.8245 * (number of people)

1st Coefficient
1.8245
0.3860

2nd Coefficient
None
4.6377

2nd model regression equation:
Cost = 0.3860 * PII + 4.6377 * SPII

10.3 Results
We can explain 36.7% of the change in cost with the number of affected people. If the number of affected
people is 1,000,000, the cost may be between $931,000 and $2,718,000 with a 95% confidence interval.
However, the second model explains the change in the cost much better than the first model with a 75% R2.
One million PII and SPII loss costs may range between $3,362,000 and $6,686,000, with a 95% confidence
interval. Unlike the earlier regression models based on the number of people or number of records (Jacobs,
2014; Romanosky, 2016), the model with the information categorization -PII and SPII- explains the variation in
a cost better.
The data breach cost ranges from $0.7 million to $1.45 billion for mega data breaches. The average cost of a
mega data breach is $172,645,200, while the median is $84,000,000. Figures 1-4 represent class-action
lawsuits, industries, and the cost of data breaches. There are 19 class-action lawsuits among 31 mega data
breaches. Data breaches having class-action lawsuits have more cost than dismissed cases on average. Also,
the trend for mega-breaches seems similar per industry, except 2015 is the worst year for medical
organizations.
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Figure 1. Data Breach per Industry

•

1◄ 00

1200
1000

~

8'.lO
6'.)()

4JO
lDO

0

•

•
.a..

t

t.ED

850

.. ..

.:- :i
BSF

hdu1try

Figure 2. Cost of the data breach per industry
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Figure 3. Class-action lawsuit per industry
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Figure 4. Data breach cost ($ in millions) vs. class-action lawsuits
Figures 5 and 6 show that SPII data breaches have more impact on costs and caused more class-action lawsuits
than the PII data breaches. Blue dots display the approved class-action lawsuits for PII and SPII data breaches.
They have more cost than the dismissed cases, which are red dots. However, while some data breaches had
one type of information breach - either PII or SPII-, some of them had both PII and SPII data breaches. It is
observed that data breaches have SPII led to more class-action lawsuits and more cost. Class-action lawsuits
are more likely to be accepted if there is proof of fraud cases. If there is no proof of fraud cases, judges may
dismiss the case until evidence of multiple fraud cases.
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Figure 5. Relationship between SPII, class-action lawsuits and cost ($ in millions)
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Figure 6. Relationship between PII, class-action lawsuits and cost ($ in millions)
Every data breach is not the same. The cases that have SPII loss have more cost comparing to non-SPII data
breaches. Although there are different regulations, the type of information determines litigations, fees, or
professional/legal expenses. According to our data, the sensitivity and the amount of the data are more critical
to determine the cost disregarding the type of industry.
The healthcare regulations mostly focus on the security of medical information, which is only held in the
healthcare sector. In contrast, financial information related regulations mostly focus type of information
disregarding the industry. For example, all online retailers are responsible for the security of the data, such as
credit/debit card numbers, social security numbers, and so on.
The type of cost incurred after a mega data breach may include remediation, investigation, increase in
cybersecurity budget, data breach settlement, legal expenses, customer notification, credit monitoring against
identity theft, or canceled business deals.

11. Conclusions
The categorization of the information as PII and SPII will provide a more accurate forecasting data breach
impact compared to earlier works (Jacobs, 2014; Layton and Watters, 2014; Ponemon, 2019; Romanosky,
2016; Verizon, 2019). Categorization of the information as PII and SPII can explain the variation in cost much
better than the number of affected people or the number of stolen records. Also, every type of record does
not have equal value as our model coefficients show that SPII's Coefficient is twelve times greater than PII's
Coefficient. The U.S. courts approve web-scraping without permission is not illegal (Mehta, 2019). Since many
people willingly share their PII, such as name, job, photo, etc. on websites, PII data breaches may have less
value compared to SPII data breaches. Therefore, the classification of the information is necessary to forecast
the impact more accurately.
The monetary impact of PII data breach compels risk managers, chief information officers, or cyber-insurance
firms to reconsider the data breach risk. This study provides a novel approach for data breach impact
assessment by categorizing personal information as sensitive and not sensitive. Therefore, future studies may
include forecasting the monetary value of intellectual property breaches such as movies, songs, or books.
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